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NOTE
Plausible Absurdities and Practical Formalities:
The Recess Appointments Clause in
Theory and Practice
David Frisof*
The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to
the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to
reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Consti-
tution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two
essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of
powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power.
Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of
the Clause but also on the ways in which powers conferred under the Clause
are exercised—in other words, on the constitutional expectations that the
president and the Senate bring to recess appointments practice. The practical
constitutional expectations that have governed recess appointments practice
have largely prevented the active use of the Clause’s many textually plausible
absurdities that would utterly disrupt the Clause’s functionality. In light of the
role that constitutional expectations play in the functionality, and therefore
constitutionality, of the Clause, the recent pro forma appointments contro-
versy should not be resolved by the courts. Instead, both the pro forma sessions
held by the Senate and the pro forma session recess appointments made by the
president present a nonjusticiable political question. By declining to decide the
constitutionality of these actions, courts will provide the executive and legisla-
tive branch the opportunity to ensure agreement as to both the construction of
the Recess Appointments Clause and the attendant constitutional expectations
that assure its functionality.
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[T]hat a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can
save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a
society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon courts the nurture of
that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.
—Learned Hand1
Introduction
On a blustery day in northeast Ohio in January 2012, President Obama
announced the recess appointment of Richard Cordray, the former attorney
general of Ohio, to the directorship of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.2 On the same day, the president also announced that he was exercis-
ing his recess appointments power to appoint Sharon Block, Richard Griffin,
and Terence F. Flynn to the National Labor Relations Board.3 In making
these appointments, the president employed his authority under the Consti-
tution’s Recess Appointments Clause, which enables him to make temporary
appointments to senior executive branch positions and to Article III courts
1. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 1692–1942, at 59, 66 (Mass. Bar Ass’n 1942),
quoted in Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doc-
trine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 324 (2002).
2. President Obama Speaks on Appointing Richard Cordray, White House (Jan. 4, 2012,
1:26 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/04/president-obama-
speaks-appointing-richard-cordray#transcript; see also David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez,
Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer Post, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1, available
at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-04/politics/35441368_1_richard-cordray-presi-
dent-obama-consumer-financial-protection-bureau.
3. Nakamura & Sonmez, supra note 2; President Obama Announces Recess Appointments
to Key Administration Posts, White House (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/01/04/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administra-
tion-posts.
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when the Senate is not in session and available to offer its advice and con-
sent on the president’s nominations.
Obama’s decision to grant recess appointments to nominees that had
been blocked by the Republican minority in the Senate was by no means
unusual. While the Recess Appointments Clause was perhaps originally in-
tended to ensure the continued functioning of the executive branch during
the Senate’s lengthy recesses,4 presidents of both parties have exercised their
constitutional powers under the Recess Appointments Clause for decades to
appoint individuals blocked by opposing parties in Congress.5 In fact, the
president’s appointments followed recent presidential practice and historical
convention to the letter, except for one small detail: the Senate, according to
its own proceedings, was not in recess.
On the date of Obama’s appointments, the Senate was in the midst of
holding pro forma sessions—sessions held purely to deny the president the
ability to make recess appointments. Pro forma sessions had their genesis in
2007, when Democratic Senate Majority Leader Reid successfully used them
to deny President Bush the ability to make any recess appointments during
his last fourteen months in office.6 Every three days, a senator would gavel
the Senate to order only to adjourn the Senate a minute or two later, thereby
carving a longer recess into a succession of shorter recesses and denying
Bush a recess of the length sufficient to make a recess appointment.7
While the pro forma sessions of 2007 and 2008 had been the work of a
Democratic Senate, a Republican House necessitated those sessions that
stymied Obama’s recess appointments power in August 2011 and attempted
to do so again in December 2011 and January 2012.8 Taking advantage of
Article I, Section 5’s requirement that “[n]either House, during the Session
of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days,”9 the Republican House, by refusing to consent to a recess with
the Democratic Senate, forced the Senate to continue its pro forma
sessions.10
As a practical matter, the pro forma sessions and the president’s recess
appointments notwithstanding, these sessions were merely the latest escala-
tion of an increasingly dysfunctional presidential appointments process. In
recent years, appointments to both Article III courts and executive agencies
have ground to a halt, considerably impeding government functions.11 As a
4. See infra Sections I.A and II.A.
5. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (detailing Presi-
dent George W. Bush’s recess appointment of a federal appellate judge whose nomination had
previously been vigorously opposed by Senate Democrats).
6. Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RS21308, Recess Appointments: Fre-
quently Asked Questions 11 (2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-
publish.cfm?pid=‘0DP%2BP%5CW%3B%20P%20%20%0A.
7. See infra Section III.A.
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
10. See infra Section III.A.
11. See infra Section II.B.
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constitutional matter, however, the Obama Administration’s assertion that
the president has the power to make recess appointments during pro forma
sessions has resulted in a flurry of challenges.12 Several courts of appeals
have held these and other recent appointments unconstitutional.13 By the
time of this Note’s publication, one such case, decided by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, Noel Canning v. NLRB, will have been briefed and argued
before the Supreme Court. In the decision below, the D.C. Circuit not only
held that the president’s appointments were unconstitutional but did so by
holding that the president could make recess appointments only during in-
tersession recesses and only when the vacancies had begun during that re-
cess,14 thereby upending long established, and previously uncontroversial,
recess appointments practice.
Unlike other clauses in the Constitution, the Recess Appointments
Clause has only occasionally been the subject of litigation. Until recently,
both its place in the constitutional structure, as a minor fulcrum of the sepa-
ration of powers between Congress and the president, and its relative unim-
portance, at least as compared with the likes of the Commerce Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause, have only rarely made it the subject of judicial
analysis.15 Prior to the current controversy, interpretation of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause has primarily occurred in opinions by attorneys gen-
eral.16 In the years leading up to the current controversy and in anticipation
of the Supreme Court’s forthcoming ruling on the scope of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause, however, legal scholars have also weighed in on the
Clause’s meaning.17
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013); Noel
Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (June 24, 2013)
(No. 12-1281); State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, No. 12-1032(ESH), 2013 WL 3945027
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013).
13. NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 660 (4th Cir. 2013); New Vista, 719
F.3d at 238–39; Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07.
14. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07, 512.
15. See Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and
Others), 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 443, 443–44 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20 (1921)
[hereinafter Daugherty Opinion]; President’s Power to Fill Vacancies in Recess of the Senate,
12 Op. Att’y Gen. 32 (1866) [hereinafter Stanbery Opinion]; Executive Authority to Fill Vacan-
cies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631 (1823) [hereinafter Wirt Opinion]; Edmund Randolph, Opinion on
Recess Appointments (July, 7 1792) [hereinafter Randolph Opinion], in 24 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 165 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990).
17. See, e.g., Blake Denton, While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a
New Interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 751 (2009); Edward
A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 377 (2005); Patrick Hein, Comment, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment
Power: The Effectiveness of Political Counterweights, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 235 (2008); Herz, supra
note 15; Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 1487 (2005); Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate Termination of Presidential Recess
Appointments, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 82 (2007), available at http://www.law.north-
western.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/2/LRColl2007n2Tillman.pdf; Michael A. Carrier, Note,
When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
February 2014] Plausible Absurdities and Practical Formalities 631
Generally, interpreters of the Recess Appointments Clause have con-
fronted three fundamental issues of constitutional construction. The Clause
reads simply, “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”18 First, it is unclear
when a vacancy must “happen” to satisfy the Clause. Must the vacancy first
“happen to arise” during the recess or need the vacancy only “happen to
exist” during the recess? In other words, if a position becomes vacant while
the Senate is in session but remains unfilled until the next recess, is the
president then able to make a recess appointment to fill the vacancy? Sec-
ond, what types of recesses are comprehended by the Clause? Are recess
appointments permitted only during intersession recesses (recesses between
distinct sessions of Congress), or are they also permitted during intrasession
recesses (breaks during a session of Congress)? Third, can the president use
the Recess Appointments Clause to make judicial appointments to Article III
courts?19
Within this framework, the history of the president’s power under the
Recess Appointments Clause has generally been one of expansion. The earli-
est interpretations of the Clause were quite narrow, limiting recess appoint-
ments to positions that happened to become vacant during an intersession
recess.20 Later interpretations expanded the power, enabling presidents to
make recess appointments regardless of when the vacancy first occurred21
and without regard to the type of recess at issue.22
2204 (1994); Amelia Frenkel, Note, Defining Recess Appointments Clause “Vacancies”, 88
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 729 (2013); Alexander I. Platt, Note, Preserving the Appointments Safety Valve,
30 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 255 (2011).
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
19. Other tangential or secondary issues concerning the Recess Appointments Clause
have also been the subject of controversy and analysis. For instance, attorneys general and
other commentators have addressed the scope of Congress’s authority to limit or deny pay to
recess appointees, Recess Appointments, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 471–75 (1960) [hereinafter
Walsh Opinion], and the length of tenure of an intrasession recess appointee (assuming the
president is authorized to make them). Id. at 469–70.
20. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1518–23 (discussing an opinion by the first attorney
general, Edmund Randolph, and President Washington’s recess appointments practice during
the First Congress).
21. Wirt Opinion, supra note 16.
22. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 16. Since 1921, opinions on the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause have focused on more technical issues, while leaving the essential construction
endorsed by Daugherty untouched. Since the Daugherty Opinion, constructions of the Clause
have focused on more narrow issues. A 1960 opinion by Acting Attorney General Walsh, en-
dorsing the conclusions reached by Wirt and Daugherty, addressed the issue of when an in-
trasession recess appointment expired, arguing that the language of the Clause—“shall expire
at the End of their next Session”—meant that a recess appointment expired not at the end of
the current session but instead at the end of the next session fully distinguished from the
current session by an intersession recess. Walsh Opinion, supra note 19, at 469–70 (quoting
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 1993 brief by the Depart-
ment of Justice, gesturing toward the Adjournments Clause, which prohibits either house of
Congress from adjourning “without the Consent of the other . . . for more than three days,”
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As with virtually all constitutional interpretation, interpreters of the Re-
cess Appointments Clause support their preferred constructions with a con-
stellation of arguments relying on the text of the Clause,23 the purpose of the
Clause within constitutional structure and separation of powers doctrine,24
long-standing historical practice,25 and changing political circumstances.26
Despite wide divergence in methodologies and conclusions, most commen-
tators agree on the Recess Appointments Clause’s overarching, dual consti-
tutional purposes: (1) maintaining a suitable balance of power between the
president and the Senate, while (2) simultaneously enabling the president to
ensure that the executive branch retains a continuous ability to execute the
law when the Senate is unavailable to act on nominations the president puts
forth.27 Obviously, when asserting that nearly all constructions of the Recess
Appointments Clause recognize these general purposes, the devil is in the
details. Identifying a “suitable balance of power” and defining with precision
the phrase “when the Senate is unavailable” are loaded exercises that serve to
radically differentiate one construction of the Clause from another.28 Despite
these differences, general coalescence around these two purposes reveals an
understanding that the Recess Appointments Clause, whatever its construc-
tion, was meant to be functional—to maintain a balance between the presi-
dent and the Senate and to ensure that the executive branch always retains
the power to execute the law.
But interpreters of the Clause do not rely merely on the inherent func-
tionality of their constructions for justification. Many interpreters, regard-
less of the particular methodology employed or the evidence cited in
support of their construction, bolster their reading of the Clause by relying
on dysfunctional counterconstructions. To follow such constructions, the ar-
gument goes, would result in absurd abuses of power by the Senate or the
president that would either eliminate the proper balance of power between
the branches or suffocate the president’s ability to see that the laws are exe-
cuted. The great variety of constructions that employ this sort of dysfunc-
tional counterconstruction argumentation demonstrates that, while perhaps
an innumerable number of constructions are textually or formalistically
plausible (and therefore defensible), one construction of the Clause is em-
phatically not available—a construction that renders the Clause dysfunc-
tional. While each reading of the Clause stakes its legitimacy, at least in part,
on the potential for absurdity and dysfunction presented by relevant
concluded that a recess merely needed to be longer than three days to be constitutionally
significant and therefore capable of supporting a valid recess appointment. U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 4; Platt, supra note 17, at 277–78.
23. See, e.g., Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 2861 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281).
24. See, e.g., Wirt Opinion, supra note 16; Randolph Opinion, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., Hein, supra note 17, at 243–49.
26. See, e.g., Platt, supra note 17, at 295–96.
27. See infra Section I.A.
28. See infra Section I.A.
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counterconstructions, each construction is nonetheless at risk of absurd in-
terpretation and dysfunctional practice.
Consequently, this Note argues that, insofar as a functional Recess Ap-
pointments Clause is the aim, functionality cannot be sought in the staid
confines of the powers conferred and abuses curtailed under any particular
textual construction. Rather, the underlying basis for functionality in the
Clause should be sought in the extratextual constitutional expectations that
both president and Senate bring to their respective roles in the appointments
and recess appointments process. Both narrow and broad constructions are
capable of sustaining a functional Recess Appointments Clause, so long as
the political branches have similar expectations for recess appointments
practice and the respective roles each branch is to play.
As Professor Primus has defined them, “[c]onstitutional expectations
are intuitions about how the system is supposed to work” that, while often
related to the text, are not bound by it.29 They are the informal rules of the
game, shaped by “a combination of experience, socialization, and princi-
ple,”30 that often do more to shape the actions of constitutional players than
the text itself.31 This is particularly true with regard to recess appointments.
The Clause, despite (or perhaps, because of) its seeming simplicity, depends
heavily on shared constitutional expectations both for its execution and to
ensure that it fulfills its functional constitutional role.
So what does this mean for the most recent controversy, in which the
absurdity of a Senate taking a recess in all but name met the absurdity of a
president making recess appointments when the Senate was not technically
in recess? Unfortunately, this Note does not argue for the easy solution of
judicial adjudication, based either on unearthed historical evidence or on
rigid adherence to one theory of constitutional construction or another. In-
stead, the aim of this Note is three-fold. First, it demonstrates that the most
basic purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause—to facilitate a functional
process that preserves both the separation of powers and the executive’s abil-
ity to execute the law without interruption—can only be understood and
served by going beyond the formal bounds of any particular construction of
the Clause and by focusing on the expectations that each branch brings to
the recess appointments process. Second, and in light of the first conclusion,
this Note differentiates the broader structural questions related to the Recess
Appointments Clause (as delineated by the various definitions of “recess”
and “happen”) from the absurd abuses of pro forma sessions and pro forma
session recess appointments. Third, this Note argues that the Supreme Court
should decline to address the constitutionality of the pro forma sessions and
the pro forma session appointments as a nonjusticiable political question,
leaving the construction of both the Clause and its attendant constitutional
expectations to the president and the Senate.
29. Richard Primus, Essay, Constitutional Expectations, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 91, 93–94
(2010).
30. Id. at 93.
31. Id. at 95.
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Part I explores the role of functionality—maintaining a balance of
power and ensuring the continued exercise of the executive power—in sev-
eral important constructions of the Clause throughout history. It also iden-
tifies the “dysfunctional” counterconstructions used to legitimize the
preferred, “functional” constructions. Last, it addresses the textually plausi-
ble absurdities in recess appointments practice that emphasize the need for
extratextual considerations to assure that the Clause is functional.
Part II demonstrates that, in historical practice, formal constructions of
the Recess Appointments Clause are connected to and dependent on sets of
constitutional expectations for their functionality. By exploring recess ap-
pointments as practiced by President Washington and the First Congress
and comparing them to modern recess appointments practice prior to the
pro forma sessions, the crucial role of constitutional expectations in ensur-
ing functionality is made clear.
Part III addresses the recent circuit court decision, Noel Canning v.
NLRB, and suggests potential avenues for restoring functionality to the Re-
cess Appointments Clause. Regardless of its merits as a matter of constitu-
tional construction, Noel Canning fails because it results in a fundamental
mismatch between the construction and the constitutional expectations of
the Clause. Other possibilities, holding either the pro forma sessions or the
pro forma recess appointments to be unconstitutional, would run contrary
to the existing Political Question Doctrine and fail to ensure functionality in
recess appointments. The best solution, instead, is to hold that the constitu-
tionality of the pro forma sessions and the pro forma session appointments
is a nonjusticiable political question, thereby encouraging the Senate and the
president to agree on a construction of the Recess Appointments Clause and
attendant constitutional expectations that assure its functionality.
I. Function and Dysfunction in Constitutional Construction
Interpreters of the Recess Appointments Clause have long justified their
preferred constructions as being functionally superior to others, insofar as
their constructions fulfill the Clause’s two fundamental purposes: (1) main-
taining a suitable balance of power between the president and the Senate,
while (2) simultaneously ensuring that the president retains the continuous
ability to execute the law, even when the Senate is unavailable to act on
nominations. Moreover, interpreters rely not only on the functionality of
their preferred constructions but also on the demonstrated dysfunctionality
of disfavored counterconstructions. If followed, these dysfunctional counter-
constructions would result in absurd presidential or senatorial abuses of
power that would completely defeat one or the other of the Clause’s funda-
mental purposes. Interpreters of the Clause have employed this mode of
argument nearly universally, regardless of whether they advocate for a nar-
row or broad interpretation of the president’s recess appointments power.
In addition to the canonical constructions, many commentators have
identified absurd, but textually plausible, interpretations of the president’s
February 2014] Plausible Absurdities and Practical Formalities 635
or the Senate’s powers under the Clause. These textually plausible absurdi-
ties, which may be grafted onto either broad or narrow constructions of the
Clause, would serve to completely undermine its purposes and turn any
“functional” construction into a “dysfunctional” one.
The great variety of constructions that rely on dysfunctional counter-
construction argumentation and the lurking presence of additional textually
plausible absurdities demonstrate that formal constructions of the Clause
cannot, of their own accord, provide for a happily functional recess appoint-
ments process. Instead, as explored in Part II, functionality is derived from
the existence of relatively uniform constitutional expectations shared by
both the president and the Senate.
Section I.A explores the role of functionality and dysfunctional counter-
constructions in the treatment of two fundamental issues relating to the Re-
cess Appointments Clause: whether a vacancy must begin during a recess to
be filled with a recess appointment and whether a president can make recess
appointments during intrasession recesses in addition to intersession re-
cesses. Section I.B examines several textually plausible absurdities that lurk
within constructions of the Recess Appointments Clause and their potential
to render any broader construction of the Clause dysfunctional.
A. Function and Dysfunction
While the current controversy has produced a veritable blizzard of inter-
pretations by courts, parties, and scholars purporting to determine the
breadth of the president’s recess appointments power, this Section looks to
older constructions of the Clause. Two reasons motivate this analysis. First,
the aim is to demonstrate that abuse and absurdity have always been part of
the calculus in interpreting the Clause, and second, however elaborate recent
interpretations have become in their exposition of text, original meaning,
structure, and history,32 arguments about function and dysfunction, abuse
and absurdity have remained largely unchanged.
One of the earliest issues regarding the Recess Appointments Clause
concerned the meaning of the word “happen” in the phrase, “[t]he President
shall have power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess
of the Senate.”33 The crux of the issue is whether “happen” means “to arise”
or “to begin” (the “arise interpretation”), thereby limiting the president to
filling vacancies that first become so during a recess, or whether “happen”
32. Cf. NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 669 (4th Cir. 2013) (Diaz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not suggest that history should be ignored as
a tool of constitutional interpretation. But one need only read the fine briefs in these cases to
recognize that, given time, savvy lawyers can excavate historical references to support virtually
any proposition.”). A glance at the length of these arguments in recent court cases gives one a
sense of the degree to which disagreeing interpretations of the Clause have mined the text,
original meaning, structural relationships, and history of the Clause to prove their points. See,
e.g., id. at 631–62 (majority opinion and Duncan, J., concurring) (spending thirty pages deter-
mining the meaning of “recess”).
33. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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means “to exist” (the “exist interpretation”), enabling the president to make
recess appointments during a recess regardless of when the vacancy first
arose. Although Attorney General Randolph embraced the narrower arise
interpretation in 179234 and President Washington did so as well around the
same time,35 the broader exist interpretation has been followed at least since
Attorney General Wirt’s opinion in 1823.36 Interested parties on both sides
of the issue have emphasized the functionality of their preferred interpreta-
tion, and more importantly, the dysfunctionality of the opposing
interpretation.
Adherents of the narrower arise interpretation, while acknowledging the
Clause’s dual purposes, have typically prioritized the Clause’s role in main-
taining a balance of power between the president and the Senate over its role
in promoting the continued exercise of executive power. In his 1792 opin-
ion,37 although Randolph acknowledged that the Recess Appointments
Clause was framed by its two fundamental purposes,38 he feared that a con-
trary interpretation would force the Senate to vote on the confirmation of a
recess appointee already in possession of the office.39 Placing the Senate in
such a situation meant that it would be unable to make a “[j]udgment abso-
lutely free” in choosing to confirm or reject the appointee’s nomination.40
For Randolph, the Senate’s ability to make confirmation decisions without
34. Randolph Opinion, supra note 16, at 165–67.
35. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1522.
36. Wirt Opinion, supra note 16. Some debate exists as to when precisely the exist
interpretation became the default. Compare Hartnett, supra note 17, at 388–401 (arguing that
the exist interpretation “dates back to at least 1813, . . . and may date back to President
Jefferson in 1801 or to President Adams in 1799”), with Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1529–35
(calling into question evidence of the exist interpretation being widely adopted prior to 1823).
37. In July 1792, Randolph penned a brief opinion endorsing the arise interpretation in
response to a query from Secretary of State Jefferson regarding whether Washington might
make a recess appointment to an office that had been created in the last Senate session but had
not yet been filled. Randolph Opinion, supra note 16, at 165–66. On April 2 of that year,
Congress had passed an act establishing the mint and the office of chief coiner, and, while the
Senate had remained in session until May 8, the president had not put forth a nominee for the
position. Id. at 166. Acknowledging that no meaningful difference existed between a vacancy
created by the death or resignation of a prior officeholder and a vacancy in a newly legislated
office, Randolph argued that even though the office of chief coiner was in fact vacant, the
president could not now make an appointment to that office. Id. at 166–67. Randolph
straightforwardly equated “happened” with “commenced,” and because the vacancy had hap-
pened while the Senate was in session, no recess appointment could therefore be made to the
office of chief coiner. Id. at 166. Randolph stated the issue at hand and his conclusion bluntly:
“[I]s it a vacancy which has happened during the recess of the Senate? It is now the same and
no other vacancy, than that, which existed on the 2nd. of April 1792. It commenced therefore
on that day or may be said to have happened on that day.” Id.
38. Id. “The Spirit of the Constitution favors the participation of the Senate in all ap-
pointments,” Randolph wrote, “[b]ut as it may be necessary oftentimes to fill up vacancies,
when it may be inconvenient to summon the senate a temporary commission may be granted
by the President.” Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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influence was an essential component of the constitutionally divided ap-
pointments power that should only be discarded in cases of absolute neces-
sity.41 On Randolph’s account, to enable the president to eliminate this
senatorial prerogative by making recess appointments without regard to
when the vacancy began would simply place too much strain on the care-
fully crafted separation of powers inherent in the Recess Appointments
Clause.42
More recently, Judge Barkett hewed to the arise interpretation in dis-
senting from an Eleventh Circuit, en banc decision upholding a recess ap-
pointment.43 Like Randolph, Judge Barkett emphasized the Clause’s dual
purposes within the constitutional structure44 while forcefully pointing out
the dysfunction inherent in the opposing counterconstruction (that is, the
exist interpretation). Under the exist interpretation, she argued, the presi-
dent could simply wait until a recess to appoint a nominee that the Senate
had refused during the last session.45 The president held “the power to re-
peatedly circumvent the Senate’s advice-and-consent role even when the Sen-
ate is not disabled from exercising that role but is, instead, perfectly capable of
exercising it.”46 To Judge Barkett, the dysfunctional counterconstruction
adopted by the court “frustrate[d] . . . the careful separation of powers in-
tended by the framers” and necessitated adherence to the narrower arise
interpretation.47
Proponents of the exist interpretation, which has attained near-universal
acceptance since the early nineteenth century,48 have also framed their con-
structions of the Clause in terms of its functionality and against the dysfunc-
tionality of the counterconstruction (here, the arise interpretation).
Adherents of the exist interpretation have acknowledged the dual purposes
41. Necessity occurred when an appointee died, resigned, or refused to accept an ap-
pointment during a recess, causing the vacancy to arise during the recess. Id.
42. Id.
43. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226–28 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that
Judge Pryor’s recess appointment to the circuit was constitutional, even though Pryor’s ap-
pointment was made during an intrasession recess and filled a vacancy that had arisen during
a prior recess).
44. Id. at 1231–34 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“Considering that the Recess Appointments
Clause was intended to enable the President to fill vacancies only when the Senate was disabled
from acting, and in light of the role that Article II gives the Senate in approving nominations
to federal offices, there must be some more meaningful limit on the President’s power to make
a recess appointment than the two the majority proposes (i.e., that the Senate be in recess and
that there be a vacancy to fill).”).
45. Id. at 1233.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1234.
48. See, e.g., id. at 1221–28 (majority opinion); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704
(2d Cir. 1962); Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16; Wirt Opinion, supra note 16.
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of the Clause49 while recognizing an imperative in the continuous exercise of
executive power.50 Unlike the legislative and judicial powers, which could
“come into play at intervals,” it is “the very essence of executive power that it
should always be capable of exercise.”51 The president must “take care that
the laws be faithfully executed,”52 a responsibility which he fulfills by acting
through the agency of others, by exercising both his powers of appointment
and removal.53
For proponents of the exist interpretation, the dysfunction inherent in
the counterconstruction is potentially ruinous. According to Wirt, if the
arise interpretation were followed, then, if a vacancy were to arise on the last
day of the Senate’s session and the president was not informed of the va-
cancy until later, the president would be unable to fill the vacancy, para-
lyzing the government.54 This potential for paralysis and for the Recess
Appointments Clause to fail in one of its primary functions—“to keep these
offices filled”55—made the arise interpretation untenable for Wirt. Even
more broadly, Attorney General Stanbery saw the arise interpretation as fa-
tally dysfunctional because, regardless of cause, it opened the possibility that
the executive branch would simply be unable to execute the laws when the
Senate was not in session.56 Wirt and Stanbery also rejected the claim that
because the exist interpretation created the potential for presidential abuse
of power, it was therefore defective. They pointed out that such an argument
both assumed a degree of moral turpitude on the part of the president57 and
49. Wirt Opinion, supra note 16, at 632. For Wirt, the balance between separation of
powers and ensuring a functioning executive power was simple: permanent appointments re-
quired the consent of the Senate while the president could make temporary appointments
whenever the Senate was unavailable to act on nominations. Id.
50. Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16, at 35–36; Wirt Opinion, supra note 16, at 632
(“The substantial purpose of the constitution was to keep these offices filled; and powers ade-
quate to this purpose were intended to be conveyed. But if the President shall not have the
power to fill a vacancy thus circumstanced, the powers are inadequate to the purpose, and the
substance of the constitution will be sacrificed to a dubious construction of its letter.”).
51. Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16, at 35.
52. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 36–37, 40.
54. Wirt Opinion, supra note 16, at 632. Any number of unanticipated calamities—
including “sudden and destructive pestilence . . . invasion . . . and a thousand other causes
which cannot be foreseen”—could prevent the Senate from holding an expected session and
offering their advice and consent on presidential nominations, thereby paralyzing the govern-
ment. Id. at 633.
55. Id. at 632.
56. Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16, at 39 (“If during the recess the power [of appoint-
ment] is not in the President, it is nowhere, and there is a time when for a season the President
is required to see that the laws are executed, and yet denied the very means provided for their
execution.”).
57. Wirt Opinion, supra note 16, at 634 (“It cannot possibly produce mischief without
imputing to the President a degree of turpitude entirely inconsistent with the character which
his office implies . . . .”).
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applied just as easily to the expansive nature of senatorial powers in the
appointments process.58
Functionality and dysfunctionality are also important to constructions
that address whether the Recess Appointments Clause permits recess ap-
pointments during intrasession recesses in addition to intersession recesses.
In 1901, Attorney General Knox argued that, although the president could
make intersession recess appointments, he lacked the authority to make in-
trasession recess appointments.59 Knox saw inescapable dysfunction in the
pro-intrasession recess counterconstruction. First, if intrasession recess ap-
pointments were permitted, Knox saw no minimal limit on the amount of
time Congress would need to be adjourned before the president could make
a recess appointment. This would enable the president to make recess ap-
pointments during very short intrasession recesses, “as from Thursday or
Friday until the following Monday,”60 the obvious consequence of which
would be to utterly destroy the Senate’s advice-and-consent role in appoint-
ments and thereby defeat one of the Recess Appointments Clause’s primary
purposes: to maintain a suitable balance of power between the Senate and
the president.61
In 1921, Attorney General Daugherty provided the counter to Knox’s
opinion and argued that the Recess Appointments Clause did provide for
intrasession recess appointments.62 Although Daugherty’s argument relied
58. Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16, at 39 (“[F]or we may imagine that the Senate
might refuse to consent to every appointment made by the President, or to any appropriation
to pay the salaries of officers, and thus leave the Executive without power to execute the
laws.”).
59. President-Appointment of Officers-Holiday Recess, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599, 601
(1901) [hereinafter Knox Opinion]. Knox’s opinion that the Constitution did not permit in-
trasession recess appointments relied on both a functional argument and other bases. Accord-
ing to Knox, “adjournment” meant a break shorter than “recess.” Id. According to ordinary
language, the Constitution, and legislative practice, “an adjournment during a session of Con-
gress means a merely temporary suspension of business from day to day, or . . . for such brief
periods over holidays as are well recognized and established and as are agreed upon” by both
houses of Congress. Id. These temporary adjournments, which occurred “during the session of
Congress,” as per the Adjournments Clause, by definition did not end the session of Congress
and therefore could not be recesses in the constitutional sense. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4). By comparison, the president could make a recess appointment
during “the recess [which] means the period after the final adjournment of Congress for the
session, and before the next session begins.” Id. For two more recent commentaries arguing
against the constitutionality of intrasession recesses, see Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1547–73,
and Carrier, supra note 17.
60. Knox Opinion, supra note 59, at 603.
61. Knox saw further potential for absurdity in permitting intrasession recess appoint-
ments. Because recess appointments last until the end of Congress’s next session, an intrases-
sion recess appointment would extend through the current session and to the end of the one
following. Id. at 603–04. Implying this result to be unacceptable, Knox contended that the only
way to frustrate it would be to assume that the return of the Senate after an intrasession
adjournment would constitute the beginning of a new session. Id. at 604. This position was
“wholly untenable” in light of the Adjournments Clause, which provides for adjournments
“during the session.” Id.
62. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 16.
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on a few precedents, it proceeded essentially on the basis of the dual pur-
poses of the Clause.63 For Daugherty, a functional Recess Appointments
Clause required giving the word “recess” a practical construction rather than
a technical one.64 Like Wirt and Stanbery before him, Daugherty viewed
intrasession recess appointments as almost obviously constitutional, given
the “disastrous consequences a contrary construction may lead to.”65
Last, Daugherty addressed the potential for dysfunctional absurdity
within his own construction. As raised by Knox twenty years previously, if
intrasession recess appointments were permitted, what was the constitution-
ally mandated minimum length of time for a recess before the president
could make a recess appointment? To Daugherty, this question lacked a pre-
cisely calculable answer. Alluding to the three days requirement of the Ad-
journments Clause,66 he reiterated that the term “ ‘recess’ must be given a
practical construction.”67 While Daugherty admitted that allowing intrases-
sion recess appointments gave the president wide discretion in
“determin[ing] when there is a real and genuine recess,” thereby preventing
the Senate from providing its advice and consent, he nonetheless saw this
power as necessary to the functionality of the Recess Appointments Clause.68
These historical constructions and counterconstructions direct us to-
ward two conclusions. First, these interpretations demonstrate that,
whatever their interpretive methods, commentators on the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause universally agreed that functionality—balancing the separa-
tion of powers and ensuring that the executive branch maintains a
63. Id. at 21–23. Daugherty first noted “that the broad and underlying purpose of the
Constitution is to prohibit the President from making appointments without the advice and
consent of the Senate whenever that body is in session so that its advice and consent can be
obtained.” Id. at 21. Daugherty then quoted with approval the purposes cited by Attorneys
General Wirt and Stanbery. Id. at 22 (“The substantial purpose of the Constitution was to keep
these offices filled; and powers adequate to this purpose were intended to be conveyed.” (quot-
ing Wirt Opinion, supra note 16, at 632) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 23 (“The
President must take care at all times that the laws be faithfully executed.” (quoting Stanbery
Opinion, supra note 16, at 35) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. Id. at 21–22 (“Regardless of whether the Senate has adjourned or recessed, the real
question . . . is whether in a practical sense the Senate is in session so that its advice and
consent can be obtained.”).
65. Id. at 23. Specifically, Daugherty saw the failure of denying intrasession recess ap-
pointments to be “the painful and inevitable result” of “prevent[ing] the exercise of govern-
mental functions,” a “catastrophe” that the Framers never could have intended. Id.
66. See infra Section III.A.
67. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 16, at 25. While “the line of demarcation can not be
accurately drawn,” he did not believe that “an adjournment for 5 or even 10 days can be said
to constitute” a recess sufficient to activate the recess appointments power. Id. In this analysis,
Daugherty relied on a 1905 Senate Judiciary Committee Report on recess appointments, which
was a response to President Roosevelt’s recess appointment shenanigans in 1903, in which the
president made well over one hundred recess appointments during an intersession recess that
“occurred” when the presiding officer of the Senate simply announced that one session had
adjourned and the next had immediately begun. See id. at 24–25; Hartnett, supra note 17, at
416.
68. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 16, at 25.
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continuous ability to exercise its power—is the essential and constitutional
purpose of the Clause. Second, by demonstrating the potential absurdities
presented by alternate constructions, these interpretations urge us to seek
functionality beyond the mere confines of constitutional construction.
B. Plausible Absurdities
In addition to the competing dysfunctional counterconstructions urged
by the commentators above, more than a few additional plausible absurdities
lurk within the Constitution. These absurdities, reflecting unconventional
(but plausible) readings of the constitutional text, aggregate power to either
the president or the Senate and thereby distort or defeat the twin purposes
of the Recess Appointments Clause. Their existence, and their at least plausi-
ble constitutionality, reinforce the notion that the functionality of the Recess
Appointments Clause is not guaranteed by any specific construction but
rather must be sought elsewhere.
St. George Tucker, one of the preeminent judges and legal scholars of
the early republic,69 was perhaps the earliest commentator to recognize plau-
sible absurdity in the Recess Appointments Clause. Writing in 1803 and
adopting the narrower arise interpretation endorsed by Randolph,70 Tucker
envisioned a constitutionally permissible method by which the president
might bypass the Senate in appointing officers.71 If an office became vacant
during a recess and the president filled the vacancy with a recess appoint-
ment, because the recess appointment lasted until the end of the next sena-
torial session, the president could then make a second recess appointment to
that office whether the Senate approved or not.72 “[I]t is evidently in the
power of the president to continue any person in office, whom he shall once
have appointed in the recess of the senate, as long as he may think proper.”73
Tucker clearly imagined that future presidents might take advantage of this
constitutional “loophole” to effectively nullify the Senate’s advice-and-con-
sent role for a significant portion of senior government offices. This potenti-
ality concentrated such power in the president, he argued, that “[e]ven the
control of elections [lost] its force” to effectively constrain the corruption
and nepotism that would inevitably flow from it.74
Attorney General Stanbery, in his 1866 opinion, perceived the risk of
mass recess appointments as well. While he acknowledged that there was an
69. Clyde N. Wilson, Foreword to St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of
the United States with Selected Writings, at viii–x (Liberty Fund 1999) [hereinafter
Tucker, Selected Writings].
70. See supra Section I.A.
71. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States (1803),
reprinted in Tucker, Selected Writings, supra note 69, at 91, 279–80. I am grateful to
Professor Rappaport for identifying this source in his article. See Rappaport, supra note 17, at
1520–21.
72. Tucker, supra note 71, at 279–80.
73. Id. at 280.
74. Id.
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obvious potential for abuse of power under the exist interpretation, in which
the president could make recess appointments regardless of when the va-
cancy began,75 he saw little in the narrower arise interpretation that would
prevent a president from acting similarly. Stanbery took Tucker’s fears to
their logical conclusion. A president acting under the arise interpretation
could, during the recess, “remove every officer . . . whose tenure of office is
not during good behavior, and thus create vacancies in the recess all to be
filled by his own appointments.”76 In so doing, the president could “defeat
entirely any participation on the part of the Senate.”77
But absurdities that might upset the functionality of the appointments
process are not merely the province of the president. Although Stanbery
recognized that, broadly speaking, a Senate that “refuse[d] to consent to
every appointment made by the President . . . [would] leave the Executive
without power to execute the laws,”78 other commentators have since identi-
fied particular constitutional quirks that could conceivably frustrate the
functionality of the Recess Appointments Clause. Professor Herz suggests,
for instance, that Congress could hold twelve full “sessions” each year, sepa-
rated by intersession recesses of a few days, instead of its customary one full
session per year.79 Because recess appointments terminate at the end of the
next session,80 the Senate would dramatically decrease the length of any re-
cess appointments made, “in effect eliminat[ing] the recess appointment
power,” regardless of whether the Clause was construed broadly or
narrowly.81
Seth Barrett Tillman proposes an even more radical use of the Senate’s
ability to manage its own proceedings. Tillman argues that the Senate could
actively use a “removal power” over recess appointees.82 In the event of a
recess appointment that the Senate found objectionable, “the Senate could
convene, immediately terminate its session, and then reconvene instantly.”83
75. Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16, at 39.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 39.
79. Herz, supra note 15, at 459. Such an adjustment in schedule would be constitutional
according to the Constitution’s provisions that “[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; Herz, supra note 15, at 459.
80. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
81. Herz, supra note 15, at 460.
82. Tillman locates this power in the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause of the Con-
stitution, which provides that “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President . . . .” U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; Tillman, supra
note 17, at 86. Under this Clause, “either the Senate acting alone or the two houses acting
collectively can terminate a presidential recess appointment.” Id.
83. Tillman, supra note 17, at 83.
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These actions would effectively terminate all prior intersession recess ap-
pointments and another quick termination and reconvention would termi-
nate all prior intrasession recess appointments.84 While this innovation
would be sure to diminish the president’s power as compared with that of
the Senate, Tillman sees its essential effect as causing the Senate to be “re-
sponsible to the electorate,” as the Senate would no longer be able to deny
responsibility for appointments by blaming the president for unpopular or
controversial recess appointments.85
These innovations, at once both plausible and absurd, point us toward a
deeper understanding of what the Recess Appointments Clause looks like.
Indeed, insofar as we are willing to concede that whatever else a constitu-
tional construction of the Recess Appointments Clause might be, it must be
functional, it appears that such constitutionality cannot be achieved through
construction of the text alone. Instead, functionality, and therefore constitu-
tionality, seems to depend on how and how often the president and the Sen-
ate exercise powers conferred to them under any particular construction of
the Clause. For instance, if the president were to make the occasional recess
appointment, even under the narrowest construction of his power, his ac-
tions would unquestionably be constitutional. If, on Tucker’s advice, how-
ever, the president were to make all his appointments during a recess
(perhaps by requesting appointees to resign during the recess), his actions
would emphatically defeat the functional purposes of the Clause, and, inso-
far as functionality is constitutionality, would appear to be unconstitutional.
Notice that the character of the power exercised is unchanged; what affects
functionality is the practice of the construed power, not the power itself.86
Given the many abuses of power that lurk within the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause, how can we differentiate between functional and dysfunc-
tional, constitutional and unconstitutional? The answer lies in
understanding and embracing the crucial role that extratextual constitu-
tional expectations play in shaping the choices of constitutional actors, espe-
cially with regard to the appointments and recess appointments process.
84. Id. at 83–84, 83 n.8. Because intrasession recess appointments last until the end of
the next full session, the additional termination and reconvention would be required to termi-
nate an intrasession recess appointment. Id. at 83 n.8.
85. Id. at 87 (emphasis omitted).
86. We could just as easily imagine actions taken by the Senate that could fit into this
broadened understanding of functionality and constitutionality. For instance, if the Senate
were to take no action on one nomination put forth by the president, that inaction would
certainly be constitutional. It is only when the Senate refuses to act on any nomination put
forth by the president and refuses to go into recess, thereby denying the president any ability to
make appointments, that its inaction becomes unconstitutional. See Lee Renzin, Note, Advice,
Consent, and Senate Inaction—Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1739, 1759–72
(1998) (arguing that the Senate’s failure to vote on nominees put forth by the president is a
failure to fulfill its nondiscretionary duty of providing advice and consent, conceivably action-
able under the Due Process or Presentments Clauses).
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II. Recess Appointments and Constitutional Expectations
Constitutional expectations, as Professor Primus tells us, “are intuitions
about how the system is supposed to work. They arise from a combination
of experience, socialization, and principle.”87 While constitutional expecta-
tions may reflect the constitutional text, they often eclipse the text in shaping
our actions and can even drive construction of the text.88 Moreover, consti-
tutional expectations are neither universal nor static,89 and when groups
hold different expectations, conflict over both the expectations themselves
and over textual meaning can arise.90 When constitutional expectations are
widely shared, however, they can form the basis for shared and universal
practice that is considered constitutional, even if the practice lacks obvious
textual support or is in fact explicitly contradicted by the text.91
Constitutional expectations explain why the president and the Senate
have typically refrained from such absurdities and employed the powers
conferred on them in a responsible and functional manner.92 To understand
how constitutional expectations can interact with the recess appointments
process, it is instructive to scrutinize practices and expectations that appear
foreign to us. The construction and expectations embraced by President
Washington and the First Congress provide just such an opportunity: they
87. Primus, supra note 29, at 93.
88. Id. at 93–94; see also id. at 97–98 (discussing the well-established and uncontrover-
sial practice of having a member of the House of Representatives, elected in a special election
during an odd year, run for reelection during the regular election cycle in the following even
year, even though the Constitution specifically provides that “the House of Representatives
‘shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States’ ”
(emphasis added by Primus) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1)).
89. Professor Primus suggests that changes in constitutional expectations result from a
variety of social, cultural, and political events. Id. at 99 (“For example, the Great Depression
prompted many Americans to reevaluate the allocation of power between the federal and state
governments. Similarly, the confrontation with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union prompted
major changes in constitutional law’s regard for racial equality, free speech, and open demo-
cratic politics.” (footnote omitted)).
90. Id. at 93, 98.
91. Id. at 98. Consider Professor Primus’s opening example, that of the oath taken by
President Obama during his inauguration in 2009. Id. at 92–93. The oath in Article II, Section
1 begins, “I do solemnly swear . . . .” yet President Obama’s oath of office began, “I, Barack
Hussein Obama, do solemnly swear . . . .” Id. at 93 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8, and
Barack Obama Re-Takes Oath of Office, YouTube (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bq_PzWzC7rA). In so doing, President Obama followed the practice of presidents
since Franklin Roosevelt (excepting Lyndon Johnson’s oath taken aboard Air Force One). Id. at
94. As Professor Primus explains, this practice—inserting one’s name into the presidential
oath—has become what we expect to hear on inauguration day. Id. at 95. These “expectations
define the operative constitutional norm, even though the text reads differently.” Id.
92. The prevailing construction of the Recess Appointments Clause has changed multi-
ple times in the past two hundred years, and without doubt, so have the correspondent consti-
tutional expectations. See discussion supra Part I. A full historical survey of these
constitutional expectations, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note iden-
tifies how constitutional expectations can shape the recess appointments practice and how this
might provide guidance in resolving the current controversy.
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construed the Clause very narrowly, limiting recess appointments to vacan-
cies that began during the recess—a limitation that has been decisively re-
jected since the 1820s. Comparing Washington’s exercise of power under the
Recess Appointments Clause to the recess appointments process prior to the
pro forma sessions helps us understand these constitutional expectations
and what options are available if we wish to return to a functional Recess
Appointments Clause.
Section II.A demonstrates the interconnection of Washington’s con-
struction of the Recess Appointments Clause with his constitutional expec-
tations and argues that the former’s functionality depends on the nature of
the latter. Section II.B provides a general sketch of recess appointments
practice and expectations prior to the pro forma sessions and explains how
the pro forma sessions and the pro forma session appointments destabilized
settled, if strained, expectations.
A. Practical Formalities: Virtue as Constitutional Expectation
President Washington’s early recess appointments practice indicates that
he subscribed to a relatively narrow construction of the Clause—limiting
recess appointments to vacancies that happened to arise during the recess.93
In the days leading up to the end of a Senate session, Washington would
submit dozens of civilian and military nominations to the Senate to ensure
that positions were filled prior to the recess.94 Then, if a confirmed ap-
pointee declined the appointment during the recess, the president would be
able to make a recess appointment because the vacancy would have arisen
during the recess.95 While Professor Rappaport sensibly reads this record to
demonstrate Washington’s adherence to the narrower arise interpretation,96
the picture remains incomplete until we place Washington’s construction of
the Clause in the context of his constitutional expectations.
A cursory examination of the typical appointments process of Washing-
ton and the First Congress reveals that it is substantially different from the
93. See Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1522–23. I am once again grateful to Professor
Rappaport for identifying the source, 2 Documentary History of the First Federal Con-
gress of the United States of America: Senate Executive Journal and Related Docu-
ments (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1974) [hereinafter Senate Executive Journal], that
provides the basis for this analysis. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1512 n.71.
94. See Senate Executive Journal, supra note 93, at 43–53.
95. See Letter from President George Washington to the Senate (Feb. 9, 1790) in Senate
Executive Journal, supra note 93, at 58–59. In this letter, Washington informed the Senate
that William Paca, Cyrus Griffin, William Nelson Jr., and William Drayton were recess ap-
pointed to positions to fill vacancies caused by the resignations of Thomas Johnson, Edmund
Pendleton, John Marshall, and Thomas Pinckney, respectively. Id. The four resigning appoin-
tees had been nominated and confirmed at the end of the previous session. Letter from Presi-
dent George Washington to the Senate (Sept. 24, 1789) in Senate Executive Journal, supra
note 93, at 44; Senate Executive Journal, supra note 93, at 44, 47–48.
96. See Rappaport, supra note 17, at 1522–23.
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appointments process that we have grown accustomed to in the late twenti-
eth and early twenty-first centuries. Throughout the First Congress, the Sen-
ate acted on the president’s nominations within two to three days, regardless
of how close the president made the nomination to the end of a session.97
Even the rare rejection of a nominee was handled promptly.98 Of course,
nothing explicit in the Appointments Clause requires such prompt action by
the Senate in exercising its advice-and-consent responsibilities.99 The prompt
mutuality exhibited by the president and the First Congress in their appoint-
ments duties undoubtedly had many causes, likely including the smaller size
of the Senate and the lesser extent of the federal government. Appointments
in those early days were simply easier.
But perhaps more importantly, it is likely that the Founding Fathers
simply assumed that this was the way that the appointments process should
operate. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton appeared to assume that the Sen-
ate could only act to confirm or reject a nominee,100 a notion seconded by
other Founding Fathers.101 This relatively specific expectation of constitu-
tional practice might have had its basis in a broader constitutional expecta-
tion: that powers conferred under the Constitution would be exercised
virtuously. Washington understood that the written Constitution, while nec-
essary, was insufficient on its own to secure the blessings of republican gov-
ernment and liberty for the people.102 Instead, Washington believed that the
success of the Constitution depended firmly on the virtue of those political
actors entrusted with the powers and responsibilities enumerated in the
Constitution.103 The new government under the Constitution “was to be, in
the first instance, in a considerable degree a government of accommodation
97. See, e.g., Senate Executive Journal, supra note 93, at 8–9 (recording the nomina-
tion and confirmation of William Short to the office of ambassador to France); id. at 13–24
(recording the nomination and confirmation of dozens of port officials); id. at 49–50 (record-
ing the nomination and confirmation of several cabinet-level officials).
98. Benjamin Fishbourn was nominated to be the naval officer of the Port of Savannah
on August 3, 1789 and was rejected by the Senate on August 5, 1789. Letter from President
George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 3, 1789) in Senate Executive Journal, supra note
93, at 16 & n.22; Senate Executive Journal, supra note 93, at 23–24. On August 7, respond-
ing to the rejection of Fishbourn, Washington wrote a letter to the Senate informing them of
the reasons for Fishbourn’s nomination and requesting that, in the future, the Senate directly
communicate its objections regarding specific nominees to the president so that the president
could share with the Senate the information on which he based his nominations. Letter from
President George Washington to the Senate (Aug. 7, 1789) in Senate Executive Journal,
supra note 93, at 24–25.
99. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
100. Matthew C. Stephenson, Essay, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Of-
ficers Without Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 Yale L.J. 940, 965–66, 966 n.82 (2013) (citing
Nos. 66, 76, and 77 of the Federalist Papers in which Hamilton appears to assume as much).
101. Id. at 966.
102. Richard Loss, The Political Thought of President George Washington, 19 Presiden-
tial Stud. Q. 471, 477 (1989).
103. Id. at 478. Washington’s belief in the absolute necessity of virtuousness in the
political class was reflected in his steadfast devotion to the establishment of a national univer-
sity in the United States. Id. at 479.
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as well as a government of laws. Much was to be done by prudence, much by
conciliation, much by firmness.”104 In other words, Washington believed vir-
tue to be a vital constitutional expectation attendant on the exercise of con-
stitutionally granted power.
This virtue is reflected in the actions of the president and the Senate.
The president endeavored to include the Senate in every appointment possi-
ble, and the Senate acted promptly on the president’s nominees. Rather than
push their constitutionally conferred powers to the utmost, they acted with
explicit and overt respect for the other branch’s constitutional role and
responsibilities.
In the final analysis, however, it is irrelevant whether a heightened sense
of virtue or something else shaped their actions. The crucial point, indispu-
table here, is that the president and the Senate, in implementing their pre-
ferred construction of the Recess Appointments Clause, did so in a way
neither required nor constrained by their construction of the text. For Wash-
ington and the First Congress, the obvious functionality of their Recess Ap-
pointments Clause depended in part on their construction of the Clause
itself and in part on a set of shared expectations. In short, it depended on
the practical formalities with which they expected the appointments game to
be played.
B. Recess Appointments in the Modern Era and Pro Forma Destabilization
With only a few exceptions since Attorney General Daugherty’s 1921
opinion, the president, the Congress, and the courts have all agreed that the
president may make both intersession and intrasession recess appointments
regardless of when the vacancies first arose. But this difference in constitu-
tional construction is not the only gulf that separates recent recess appoint-
ments and appointments practice in general from those of President
Washington. Unlike in Washington’s era, modern presidents make recess ap-
pointments largely in the face of political opposition, and they do so with
some frequency.105 Moreover, recess appointments are made in the context
of an appointments process of astonishing sluggishness: some vacancies re-
main open for years106 and appointees may wait for months before being
104. Id. at 478 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Catherine Macauley Gra-
ham (Jan. 9, 1790), in 30 The Writings of George Washington 495, 496 (John C. Fitzpat-
rick ed., 1939)).
105. President Reagan made 240 recess appointments in two terms, President George
H.W. Bush made 77 recess appointments in one term, and President Clinton made 139 in two
terms. Hein, supra note 17, at 236. President George W. Bush made 171 recess appointments
in his terms, although pro forma sessions prevented him from making recess appointments
during the last fourteen months of his presidency. President Obama, as of June 4, 2013, had
made 32 recess appointments. Hogue, supra note 6, at 1, 11.
106. See, e.g., Judicial Emergencies as of 02/01/2013, U.S. Courts (Feb. 1, 2013), http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/archives/201302/psoutput/jdarevac.
html (identifying thirty judicial vacancies, as of February 1, 2013, that qualify as “judicial
emergencies” because of the high level of filings in that court or because the vacancy has been
in existence for more than eighteen months). A cursory examination of the archives available
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confirmed.107 As is well documented, increased political polarization has
played no small part in creating these circumstances.108
But it is not political polarization alone that has slowed down the ap-
pointments process such. Scholars have suggested at least two other potential
contributing factors. First, the dramatically expanded size and scope of the
administrative state and the federal judiciary may simultaneously decrease
the urgency of filling vacancies109 and make filling vacancies more politically
contentious.110 Second, Congress has provided for an alternative temporary
appointments process by means of a statute enabling vacancies to be filled
with “acting appointees” who serve for a limited time period.111 While this
statute might arguably reduce the need for quick appointments to the execu-
tive branch, some have suggested that it is largely ineffective in limiting the
costs caused by extended vacancies.112
Prior to the pro forma sessions, these factors sustained a semifunctional
Recess Appointments Clause grounded in expectations of political puffery
and, ultimately, compromise or acquiescence. In other words, the Senate113
here suggests that, in recent years, a substantial number of judicial vacancies have been open at
any one time. See, e.g., Current Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Courts (Dec. 1, 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/archives/201212/psoutput/jdar
vac1_current_circuit.html (83 vacancies); Current Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, U.S.
Courts (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/arch
ives/201012/jdarvac1_current_circuit.html (110 vacancies); Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary,
U.S. Courts (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/
archives/200812/current_vacancy_list.pdf (42 vacancies); Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary,
U.S. Courts (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/
archives/200412/current_vacancy_list.pdf (29 vacancies); Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary,
U.S. Courts (Dec. 4, 2000), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/
12042000/judgevacancy.htm (67 vacancies); Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Courts
(Dec. 1, 1996), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/archives/1981_
1985/Dec_Vacancies_1996.pdf (75 vacancies); Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Courts
(Dec. 1, 1992), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/Vacancies/archives/1981_
1985/Dec_Vacancies_1992.pdf (104 vacancies).
107. See Mark Eisen, Note, Who’s Running This Place? A Comparative Look at the Politi-
cal Appointment System in the United States and Britain, and What the United States Can Learn,
30 B.U. Int’l L.J. 295, 320 (2012).
108. See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to
Executive Branch Nominations 1885–1996, 43 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1122, 1126, 1141 (1999).
109. See Denton, supra note 17, at 763–65 (arguing that having more than eight hun-
dred federal district and circuit judges means that the death or resignation of one judge will no
longer shut down an entire court).
110. See Developments in the Law—Presidential Authority, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2057,
2138–44 (2012).
111. Vacancies Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d (2012); see also Henry B. Hogue, Cong.
Research Serv., RS21412, Temporarily Filling Presidentially Appointed, Senate-Con-
firmed Positions 2 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21412.pdf. Under
this Act, acting appointees can typically serve for 210 days. 5 U.S.C. § 3346.
112. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82
S. Cal. L. Rev. 913, 934, 938–46 (2009).
113. In discussing recent recess appointments practice in this Section, generic refer-
ences to the Senate are meant to capture the part of the Senate that opposed the president at
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and the president engaged in a continuing contest of political will: the Sen-
ate would bluster about the inadequacy or inappropriateness of the presi-
dent’s nominees or simply place a hold on nominees in exchange for the
funding or initiation of pet projects, and the president would complain
about the Senate’s (or a senator’s) refusal to provide his nominees with an
up or down vote.114 Depending on how the political winds were blowing, the
Senate would weigh how long to continue its dissembling and the president
would weigh whether compromise or recess appointments were the proper
response.115
So long as the conflict between the Senate and the president remained
political, both sides had tools with which they could readjust the balance
between the Clause’s two competing purposes. The Senate, if it felt that its
role in the appointments process was being denigrated, could threaten spe-
cific slowdowns of nominees or hold up other presidential priorities. The
president, if he felt that the Senate was impeding the continued exercise of
the executive power, could make the requisite recess appointments over the
Senate’s objection. While this kind of intense politicization might not pro-
duce a perfectly functional recess appointments clause, nor could it devolve
into utter dysfunction in which one or the other of the Clause’s dual pur-
poses would be ignored entirely. These constitutional expectations, like
those of Washington, are neither defined by nor bounded by the construc-
tion of the Clause presently in vogue.116 It was in this context, of both a
broad construction of the Recess Appointments Clause and highly
politicized constitutional expectations, that the pro forma sessions were
implemented.
any particular time, whether the opposing party in the majority or the opposing party in the
filibuster-proof minority.
114. In 1985, for example, Democratic Senate Minority Leader Byrd warned President
Reagan against making any recess appointments during an upcoming recess. Hein, supra note
17, at 253. When Reagan ignored Byrd’s warning and made recess appointments, Byrd and the
Senate Democrats held up seventy executive and judicial nominations. Id. at 253–54. In re-
sponse, President Reagan agreed to provide the Senate majority and minority leadership with
advance notice of potential recess appointees. Id. at 254.
115. In 2006, for example, in response to Senate outrage regarding the recess appoint-
ment of John Bolton to the office of ambassador to the United Nations, President Bush, while
complaining of “Senate obstructionism,” opted not to reappoint Bolton during the second
recess for fear that it would worsen relations between the legislative and executive branches.
Hein, supra note 17, at 255–56.
116. It is not hard to imagine more cordial constitutional expectations in the context of
the presently favored broad construction of the Clause. The Senate could work in good faith to
give its advice and consent as quickly as possible. Given the sheer number of appointments to
be made, these efforts still might not ensure that all vacancies would be filled during the
session and the president might then feel the need to make recess appointments. Respecting
the Senate’s good faith, however, the president might willingly subject recess appointments to
immediate Senate approval upon its return and might offer up another nominee in the event
that the Senate rejected the full nomination of a recess appointee.
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III. Pro Forma Sessions and the Future of the Recess
Appointments Clause
The pro forma sessions and the president’s correspondent recess ap-
pointments pose a potentially lethal challenge to maintaining some sem-
blance of functionality in recess appointments practice. Both the pro forma
sessions and the president’s appointments during these sessions constitute
the very plausible absurdities that previous interpreters of the Clause wor-
ried about.117 Both carry plausible textual justifications, but both also seem
facially absurd: the Constitution neither intended for Congress to declare
itself to be in session when no one was in the capital, nor intended for the
president to make recess appointments when the Senate says that it is not in
recess.
Neither of these plausible absurdities deserves a judicial imprimatur of
constitutionality. Absurdities of this sort do not reflect the Constitution it-
self, but rather reflect the discretionary and highly malleable constitutional
expectations related to the Clause. These absurdities present quintessential
political questions that should be left to the judiciary’s coordinate branches
of government. Leaving the question of constitutionality to the legislative
and executive branches also ensures that the Recess Appointments Clause
will remain semifunctional.
Section III.A presents as background the facts and legal arguments in
support of both the pro forma sessions and the president’s pro forma ses-
sion recess appointments. Section III.B exposes the failures of the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Noel Canning in framing the question, especially in light of the
connection between constitutional expectations and functionality. Section
III.C argues that although holding either the pro forma sessions or the pro
forma session recess appointments unconstitutional might be appealing as a
temporary solution, it encourages the Senate and the president to explore
other absurdities that could conceivably destroy functionality. Section III.D
argues that the best solution, instead, is to hold that the constitutionality of
the pro forma sessions and the pro forma session appointments is a nonjus-
ticiable political question. This solution has two vital advantages. First, it
maps onto existing political question jurisprudence and avoids entangling
the judiciary in future discretionary decisions by its coordinate branches.
Second, by leaving the constitutionality of the Recess Appointments Clause
largely up to the Senate and the president, it urges them to settle their differ-
ences and embrace a set of constitutional expectations that enables recess
appointments practice to be functional.
A. The Pro Forma Sessions and Pro Forma Session Recess Appointments
At the time of their implementation, the constitutional basis for the pro
forma sessions relied on reading the Recess Appointments Clause and the
Adjournments Clause together. Under this analysis, the Adjournments
117. See supra Part I.
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Clause’s limitation that “[n]either House, during the Session of Congress,
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days,”118 sets a minimal length of time for which recesses could have consti-
tutional significance and could therefore provide an opportunity for the
president to make a recess appointment.119 In 2007, Senate Democrats
adopted this reasoning and held pro forma sessions over the Thanksgiving
“recess” to prevent President Bush from making any recess appointments.120
Proving successful, the Senate continued pro forma sessions through the end
of Bush’s presidency, preventing him from making any more recess
appointments.121
In 2011, the pro forma sessions took on an added twist. This time, Re-
publican senators urged Republican Speaker of the House Boehner to refuse
to consent to adjournment of more than three days for the rest of President
Obama’s term.122 Because the Senate would be unable to adjourn for more
than three days, and because a recess needed to be more than three days to
support a recess appointment, the House’s refusal to adjourn would thereby
defeat Obama’s recess appointments power.123
Unlike Bush, however, Obama called Congress’s bluff. In making his
recess appointments during the pro forma session, Obama relied on two
arguments. First, that the president had authority to make recess appoint-
ments during an intrasession recess of twenty days, and second, that a prac-
tical construction of the Recess Appointments Clause “focus[es] on the
Senate’s ability to provide advice and consent to nominations,” rather than
on whether the Senate is technically in recess.124
B. Framing the Issue: Willful Ignorance Is Undeserved Bliss
The D.C. Circuit, declining to address the unique nature of the pro
forma sessions and the president’s subsequent appointments as briefed by
118. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
119. Hogue, supra note 6, at 2–3. The Department of Justice prominently and explic-
itly made this textual argument in 1993 in a brief submitted in the case Mackie v. Clinton, 827
F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993). Hogue, supra note 6, at 3–4.
120. Hogue, supra note 6, at 11. While 2007 was the first implementation of pro forma
sessions to block recess appointments, it was not the first time the Senate considered such an
idea. Id. at 11 & n.44. During the 1980s and 1990s, both Democratic and Republican Senators
threatened their use. Id.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Id.
124. Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstand-
ing Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 2012 WL 168645, 4 (Op. O.L.C. Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter
OLC 2012 Memo].
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both Noel Canning125 and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”),126
instead held that, because the proper construction of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause limits the president’s power to making only intersession recess
appointments to vacancies that first arose during that recess, the appointments
in question were unconstitutional.127 The court’s originalist construction
overturned more than 90 years of settled practice regarding intrasession re-
cess appointments and almost 200 years of making recess appointments so
long as the vacancy exists during the recess.128 The merits of the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s reasoning on the meanings of “happen” and “recess” are beyond the
focus of this Note, and the parties before the Supreme Court will doubtless
argue this issue in much greater depth than is possible here. Instead, the aim
of this Section is to demonstrate not that the D.C. Circuit reached the wrong
answer but that it asked the wrong question.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already expressed its openness to decid-
ing the case on different grounds, asking the parties to brief the additional
question of “[w]hether the President’s recess-appointment power may be
exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in pro forma ses-
sions.”129 But even this question risks confusing the true issue. It is not a
125. The petitioner, Noel Canning, in contesting the legitimacy of a decision of the
NLRB, argued that the three members of the NLRB appointed during the pro forma session
were appointed unconstitutionally. Final Joint Brief for Petitioner Noel Canning and Movant-
Intervenors Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the Coalition for a
Democratic Workplace at 2–5, Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Nos.
12-1115, 12-1153), 2012 WL 5982360, at *2–3, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013) (June 24,
2013) (No. 12-1281). Noel Canning argued that the pro forma sessions are real sessions of the
Senate and that the adjournments of less than three days separating such sessions lack the
constitutional significance necessary to support a recess appointment. Id. Unsurprisingly, Noel
Canning relied on a dysfunctional counterconstruction to drive home its argument. Allowing
the president the discretion to determine when the Senate is “unavailable” to receive nomina-
tions and is therefore in “recess,” argued Noel Canning, “would enable the President to both
unilaterally declare recesses and make unilateral recess appointments, eviscerating the Senate’s
constitutional role in the appointments process.” Id. at 4–5, 2012 WL 5982360, at *4–5 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
126. In response, the NLRB argued that the practical effect of the Senate’s actions dur-
ing the pro forma sessions was to be in recess. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at
11–12, Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153), 2012 WL 5982362, at *11–12.
The Senate, according to the NLRB, had passed, “by unanimous consent, an order that it
would not engage in any business” during the January pro forma sessions. Id. Moreover, the
Senate treated the January break as a recess and structured its affairs accordingly. Id. Last, like
Noel Canning, the NLRB argued against the dysfunctional counterconstruction that ruling in
Noel Canning’s favor would entail. If the Senate could transform longer recesses into shorter
three-day recesses, despite officially declaring that no business is to be conducted during the
pro forma sessions, it “would frustrate the constitutional design that ensures a mechanism for
filling offices at all times . . . [and] would have substantially impaired the functioning of an
Executive Branch agency and undermined the President’s responsibility to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’ ” Id. at 12–13, 2012 WL 5982362, at *12–13 (quoting U.S. Const.
art. II, § 3).
127. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07.
128. See supra Section I.A.
129. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013), granting cert. to Noel Canning, 705
F.3d 490.
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question of when the president may make recess appointments but of
whether the Senate may manipulate its calendar so as to deny the president a
Senate available to receive presidential nominations, while simultaneously
denying him his recess appointments power. It is also a question of whether
the president, in response, can make recess appointments when the Senate
does not hold itself to be “in recess.” Like the absurdities of a president who
makes only recess appointments or a Senate that never votes on the nomina-
tions before it, these are ploys to which the text, the writings of the Foun-
ders, and all subsequent constitutional history offer no clear answers.
Without a doubt, the D.C. Circuit takes comfort in the fact that its
originalism enables it to resolve the case while avoiding these dicey issues.
But this comfort is undeserved. By declining to address the facts on the
ground as they are, the court, with one swift blow, has severed long-held
and firmly entrenched constitutional expectations from their attendant con-
stitutional construction. Insofar as functionality remains the guiding light in
the understanding and practice of the Recess Appointments Clause, it is
clear that no mere construction of the Clause can achieve it. If the D.C.
Circuit’s decision were to stand, we would be left with an eighteenth-century
construction and twenty-first-century expectations. The court’s decision
hands the game to the Senate and, given present-day politicized expecta-
tions, ensures that dysfunctionality will be the inevitable result.
C. The Perils of Judicial Resolution on the Merits
Once the question has been framed in this manner, the difference be-
tween determining the constitutional meanings of “happen” and “recess”
and adjudicating the constitutionality of the pro forma sessions and the pro
forma session recess appointments becomes clear. Defining “happen” and
“recess” merely provides the broad structure of the recess appointments
power and, regardless of whether they are construed broadly or narrowly,
provides conceivable bases for functional recess appointments processes.130
In contrast, the pro forma sessions and the subsequent appointments are
themselves plausible absurdities.131 The Senate’s and the president’s actions
are efforts to stretch and redefine constitutional expectations regarding re-
cess appointments practice.
130. See supra Section I.A.
131. Judges have recognized the absurdities inherent in both sides of the pro forma
controversy. See NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 651 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
intrasession definition offers vague and the unavailable-for-business definition offers no dura-
tional guideposts. Under these definitions of the term ‘the Recess,’ the President simply is left
to determine whether the Senate is in recess, with little or no guidance and/or judicial over-
sight.”); id. at 671–72 (Diaz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the majority
would have it, the Senate is free to read out of the Constitution the President’s recess appoint-
ment power by refusing to take intersession recesses, opting instead to take an extended in-
trasession break . . . . To make matters worse . . . it actually gives the House of Representatives
a de facto veto on presidential recess appointments.”).
654 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:627
Of course, there is nothing inherent about constitutional expectations
that prevent them from changing or from being adjudicated by the Court.
Constitutional expectations can change through a variety of means, and
such changes can be enshrined by the Supreme Court.132 As Professor
Primus notes, recent Second Amendment victories before the Supreme
Court “do[ ] not reflect the discovery of a heretofore neglected but inher-
ently correct reading of the text”; they instead reflect “a victory for a politi-
cal movement that, over the course of decades, persuaded many people to
adopt a certain view of that text.”133 The Court has also been closer to the
vanguard in efforts to change constitutional expectations.134
But simply because the Court could enshrine different constitutional
expectations with regard to the Recess Appointments Clause does not mean
that it should. If the Supreme Court, as a practical matter, were to hold that
the Senate can be in recess without being “in recess,” then what majority or
filibuster-proof minority in the Senate would ever allow the president to
again make recess appointments when it could so effectively prevent him
from doing so? If the Court were to hold that the president can make “recess
appointments” when the Senate says that it is not in recess, it would em-
bolden the executive branch, perhaps encouraging a future president to
make the absurdist “lunch recess appointments”135—those that haunt the
dreams of ardent Senate partisans—a reality.
The Court ought not to enforce one absurdity simply because it finds it
to be slightly more textually plausible than the next. Either decision, like the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Noel Canning, would give the winning branch of
government a powerful, judicially approved weapon in asserting itself in the
appointments process. While these holdings might seem to offer certainty in
defining the bounds of the Clause—a valued feature in separation of powers
doctrine136—it is doubtful that such a decision would settle recess appoint-
ments practice for long. More likely, it would start an arms race, with both
the Senate and the president looking for whatever textually plausible absurd-
ity would give one a slight and fleeting advantage over the other.137
132. Primus, supra note 29, at 99–100.
133. Id. at 100.
134. E.g., id. at 102–05 (discussing the Court’s role in shifting constitutional expecta-
tions with respect to racial equality and the federal government through its decision in Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
135. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 230 (3d Cir. 2013).
136. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 2861 (2013) (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281) (“As the Supreme Court has observed when
interpreting ‘major features’ of the Constitution’s separation of powers, we must ‘establish[ ]
high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially
defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.’ ” (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
U.S. 211, 239 (1995))).
137. A tentative détente appeared possible in July 2013, when Senate Republicans and
Democrats were able to compromise on several politically controversial nominees and agen-
cies—including Richard Cordray, nominated to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau and alternative nominees to the NLRB—and were able to confirm them. See Jonathan
Weisman & Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Strikes Filibuster Deal, Ending Logjam on Nominees,
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D. Political Question Doctrine: The Benefits of Deciding Without Deciding
Framing the issue in this manner—whether the Senate may manipulate
its calendar to deny the president his recess appointments power while si-
multaneously engaging in a practical recess, and whether the president, in
response, can make recess appointments despite the fact that the Senate has
not held itself to be “in recess”—also demonstrates its nonjusticiability as a
political question.
In Baker v. Carr, the foundation for the modern-day political question
doctrine, the Court identified six factors that might betray the presence of a
political question: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department,” (2) “a lack of judicially
discoverable or manageable standards for resolving it,” (3) “the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion,” (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking indepen-
dent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government,” (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made,” and (6) “the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.”138
Other interpreters have also employed these factors in arguing for or
against the application of the political question doctrine to aspects of the
Recess Appointments Clause. In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that the discretionary authority of the president to recess appoint an
individual whose confirmation had previously been blocked in the Senate
presented a nonjusticiable political question.139 The court also held that the
president could make both intrasession recess appointments and recess ap-
pointments to vacancies that existed prior to the recess, but it noted that “we
lack the legal standards—once we move away from interpreting the text of
the Constitution—to determine how much Presidential deference is due to
N.Y. Times, July 17, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/us/politics/
senators-near-agreement-to-avert-fight-over-filibuster.html. This no longer seems a likely pos-
sibility. In November 2013, after renewed Republican stonewalling of specific executive and
judicial nominees, Senate Democrats opted to reform the Senate rules, eliminating the filibus-
ter for executive and judicial nominees and requiring only a simple majority to end debate on
executive and judicial nominees. Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall
Nominees, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/
us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html. While this reform lessens
the possibility of controversial recess appointments when the presidency and the Senate are
controlled by the same party, it has heightened the already-considerable animosity between
the two parties. In the likely event that the presidency and the Senate are not controlled by the
same party in the near future, a Supreme Court decision vindicating either of the pro forma
absurdities would only encourage more constitutional shenanigans. As has already been estab-
lished, no shortage of plausible absurdities exists from which the president and the Senate can
draw. See supra Section I.B.
138. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
139. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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the Senate when the President is exercising the discretionary authority that
the Constitution gives fully to him.”140
Most recently, Professor Williams, in an amicus curiae brief to the Su-
preme Court, argues that the Court should hold that the president’s pro
forma session recess appointments present a political question.141 Williams’s
argument strikes broadly. First, he argues that the Framers’ decision to en-
dow the president with “predominant authority over appointments while
restricting the Senate to an advisory consent vote,” especially in contrast to
Congress’s role in appointments during the confederation, demonstrates a
“textually demonstrable commitment” of the power to the president.142 Sec-
ond, he maintains that this exclusive authority, embodied in the terms “the
Recess” and “Vacancies that may happen,” contains no identifiable textual
limit, similar to the lack of a limit in the word “try” in the Impeachment
Power Clause, as determined in Nixon v. United States.143 Third, Williams
reasons that, properly framed in light of the Senate minority’s extended
campaign of obstruction of presidential nominations, there are no judicially
manageable standards for resolving the recess appointments controversy.144
Last, Williams argues that, in light of the substantial political and economic
disruptions already caused by challenges to the recess appointments, the
need for finality is extreme.145
Williams’s arguments have already been largely rejected by the Third
Circuit, which, in a case decided in May 2013, ruled that the recess appoint-
ment of Craig Becker to the NLRB during a two-week intrasession recess in
March 2010 was unconstitutional because the word “recess” comprised only
140. Id. Patrick Hein analyzes this decision in his comment as demonstrative of the
judiciary’s long-standing acquiescence to the broad interpretation of the Recess Appointments
Clause asserted by the executive branch. Hein, supra note 17, at 265–68. Hein’s aim is both to
justify a broad recess appointment power and to demonstrate the means by which both the
legislative and judicial branches have acceded to the executive’s interpretation. Id. at 240–41.
Moreover, Hein is concerned with generic application of the Political Question Doctrine to the
Recess Appointments Clause, in contrast to the aim of this Note, which is to apply the Political
Question Doctrine only to the plausible absurdities of the pro forma sessions, rather than to
the Clause’s entire scope. Id. at 265–68.
141. Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Victor Williams in Support of Petitioner, NLRB
v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281 (U.S. May 28, 2013) [hereinafter Williams Amicus Brief], 2013
WL 2365102.
142. Id. at 9–16, 2013 WL 2365102, at *9–16.
143. Id. at 16–17, 2013 WL 2365102, at *16–17 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), the Court held that the shape and meaning of the
impeachment power was a political question delegated to the Senate and that the Senate’s
procedures were not subject to judicial review. Id. at 238. The Court’s opinion emphasized
that the Constitution gave the Senate “sole Power to try all Impeachments.” Id. at 229 (empha-
sis added) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6). These words indicated a “grant of authority
to the Senate” that was both exclusive and without implied limitation. Id. at 229–30. The
Court also recognized that both the “lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief
counsel[ed] against justiciability.” Id. at 236.
144. See Williams Amicus Brief, supra note 141, at 21–24, 2013 WL 2365102, at *21–24.
145. Id. at 27–29, 2013 WL 2365102, at *27–29.
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intersession recesses.146 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the
definition of “recess” was not a political question, specifically rejecting
nearly identical arguments put forth in an earlier amicus curiae brief by
Williams.147 It rejected the notion that the president’s unilateral authority to
make recess appointments included an authority to determine when he
could make recess appointments, stating that it does not “textually com-
mit[ ] to the president the task of defining ‘recess.’ ”148 As the court empha-
sized, the Clause “does not provide unqualified power to either the Senate or
the president that would suggest it makes a textual commitment to ei-
ther.”149 The requirement that the Senate be in recess, according to the
court, limited the president’s recess appointment power, while the Senate’s
absence during senatorial recesses limited its power of advice and consent.150
The Third Circuit also rejected Williams’s argument that no judicially man-
ageable standards existed for determining the meaning of “recess,” noting
that both an intersession definition and a definition based on the three-days
requirement of the Adjournments Clause presented manageable
standards.151
In light of these recent analyses, two observations are worth noting.
First, in addition to the critiques leveled by the Third Circuit, Williams’s
argument that the lack of a textual limit on the president’s exclusive recess
appointments authority renders such authority unreviewable proves too
much. It would result in the same plausible absurdity as a decision on the
merits in favor of the president, enabling a president to make a recess ap-
pointment without regard to the stated availability or sessions of Congress.
The case hinges only on whether the pro forma sessions and the pro forma
session recess appointments ought to be considered political questions, not
on the justiciability of the entire breadth of the Recess Appointments Clause.
Similarly, because it focused on determining whether the definition of “re-
cess” is a political question, the Third Circuit’s analysis does not bear di-
rectly on the question here. Indeed, this Note does not dispute that the
definitions of “recess” and “happen” within the Clause are justiciable issues.
As emphasized in Section III.C, defining the broad contours of the Recess
Appointments Clause, as demarcated by the words “recess” and “happen,” is
a question separate from determining the justiciability of absurd abuses of
recess appointments power by either the Senate or the president.152
146. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
147. Id. at 215–17.
148. Id. at 216.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 217.
152. The Third Circuit identifies a similar distinction, noting that determining “when
the president can use his recess-appointments power” is an issue separate from determining
“how the president can use that power.” Id. at 217 (emphases added).
658 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:627
To understand why the pro forma actions of both the Senate and the
president ought to be considered nonjusticiable political questions, it is im-
portant to return to the underlying purposes of the political question doc-
trine. Despite Baker’s six factors, the purposes of the doctrine can be
distilled to two153: The classical political question doctrine comprises the no-
tion that in some cases, “[t]he Constitution carves out certain categories of
issues that will be resolved as a matter of total legislative or executive discre-
tion.”154 The prudential political question doctrine is a “judge-made overlay”
employed by courts to “avoid deciding controversial cases” and to “protect
their legitimacy and to avoid conflict with the political branches.”155
These purposes illuminate the applicability of the political question doc-
trine to the pro forma sessions and pro forma appointments. No matter how
the broader recess appointments power is structured (that is, how “recess”
and “happen” are construed), the Constitution provides both the president
and the Senate total discretion to engage in abuses that render the Recess
Appointments Clause dysfunctional and therefore defeat the very purpose of
the Clause within the constitutional structure. The Adjournments Clause,156
the Proceedings Clause,157 and Article I, Section 4, Clause 2,158 unequivocally
provide the Senate with the ability to determine its own session, rules, and
153. In a recent concurrence, Justice Sotomayor placed the six Baker factors into three
purpose-oriented categories. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1431–32
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The first factor—
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment”—reflected the idea that the Court “lacks
authority to resolve [the] issue.” Id. at 1431 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The second and third factors—a lack of judicially man-
ageable standards and “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”—“reflect circumstances in which a dispute calls for
decisionmaking beyond courts’ competence.” Id. at 1431–32 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fourth, fifth, and sixth factors—
“expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” a need for finality,
and the potential for embarrassment of “multifarious pronouncements”—“address circum-
stances in which prudence may counsel against a court’s resolution of an issue presented.” Id.
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Barkow, supra note 1, at 247–48. This doctrine is encapsulated by the first Baker
factor (and potentially the second). Id. at 265. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this
doctrine was considered to be at one end of a spectrum of considerable judicial deference to
the political branches, while declaring only statutes at “irreconcilable variance” with the Con-
stitution to be unconstitutional was at the other. Id. at 250–52 (quoting The Federalist No.
78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Political questions of this sort
“involve areas in which the Constitution vests the political branches with discretion.” Id. at
249.
155. Id. at 253. The prudential political question doctrine is encapsulated by the last
four Baker factors and potentially the second. Id. at 265.
156. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress,
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”).
157. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”).
158. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year and
such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a
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calendar. The Recess Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause159 pro-
vide the president with the authority to make recess appointments to offices
created and mandated by law and to see that the laws are executed. While
these Clauses lack the unique language of the Impeachments Clause that was
held to be so pivotal in Nixon,160 textual commitment need not rely on such
specific language.161 These Clauses provide both branches of government
with wide-ranging authority, authority that could be quite plausibly read to
include any number of the absurdities cataloged in Section I.B.162 They also
reach to the very foundational workings of the political branches. The legis-
lature must be able to independently set its own calendar and agenda, and
the president, in light of a constitutional structure that envisions an execu-
tive branch manned by appointees charged with executing the law, must be
able to make such appointees.163 By ruling on the constitutionality of the pro
forma sessions and recess appointments, the Court exposes itself to future
litigation on these highly discretionary functions. As Justice Scalia has com-
mented, “official representations” of “matters of internal process” must “be
accepted at face value” by the Court.164
different Day.”), amended by amend. XX, § 2 (changing the constitutionally required first day
of the session to be January 3).
159. Id. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
160. See supra note 143.
161. In two concurrences to Nixon, both Justices Stevens and Souter dismissed the no-
tion that the specific wording of the Clause was essential to the holding. Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For me, the debate about the
strength of the inferences to be drawn from the use of the words ‘sole’ and ‘try’ is far less
significant than the central fact that the Framers decided to assign the impeachment power to
the Legislative Branch.”); id. at 252 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he functional
nature of the political question doctrine requires analysis of ‘the precise facts and posture of
the particular case,’ and precludes ‘resolution by any semantic cataloguing.’ ” (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))); see also Barkow, supra note 1, at 253 (“Given that the Consti-
tution does not contain an express textual commitment of judicial review in the Supreme
Court, it is not surprising that provisions of the Constitution do not explicitly strip the Court
of power and vest interpretive authority with Congress or the Executive.”).
162. It is worth noting that the plausible absurdities of the pro forma controversy and
the other plausible absurdities available to the Senate and the president do not take the form of
actions typically reviewable by the courts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
when a constitutional question involves a question of statutory interpretation, such a question
is unlikely to be a nonjusticiable political question. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S.
221, 230 (1986). The pro forma sessions controversy is emphatically not a question of statu-
tory interpretation.
163. Stanbery Opinion, supra note 16, at 36 (“But the President, although the source of
executive power, cannot exercise it all himself. . . . He must act by the agency of others.”).
164. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 410 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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Moreover, to solve one problem here is to beget another. If the Court
condemns the Senate’s duplicity,165 it condones the president’s overreach;166
if the Court condemns the president’s overreach, it condones the Senate’s
duplicity. As the Court emphasized in Nixon, “the lack of judicially manage-
able standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually de-
monstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”167 That no judicial
resolution of the controversy will satisfactorily curtail the abuses of both
branches indicates that the final resolution of these issues must be textually
committed to the political branches.168 The Recess Appointments Clause is
not textually committed to either the president or the Senate exclusively so
much as it is committed to the both of them under the idea that the elected
branches of government will in fact govern.
Both because we consider the ultimate authority over these Clauses to
be delegated to the political branches and because it is well-nigh impossible
to imagine discoverable and manageable judicial standards by which such
absurdities might be contained, the constitutionality of the pro forma ses-
sions and the pro forma recess appointments must be considered to present
a nonjusticiable political question.169
Of course, such a resolution is far from immediately satisfactory. While
it risks further dysfunction, it also places on the shoulders of the legislative
and executive branches the burden of finding functionality for themselves; in
the end, right where it has always been.170 It may be that pro forma sessions
165. Cf. NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 676 (4th Cir. 2013) (Diaz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s view also ignores the modern
recess practices of the Senate, wherein intrasession recesses have become the norm . . . . [I]t . . .
grants the Senate—through the use of a procedural artifice unworthy of the world’s greatest
deliberative body—unfettered power to prevent the President from making recess appoint-
ments to fill up important offices.” (emphasis added)).
166. Cf. id. at 634 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Recess Appointments Clause was de-
signed to prevent the President from unilaterally exercising appointment power, thereby pre-
serving the separation of the powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches.”).
167. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993).
168. In a way, the lack of judicially manageable standards here results in a curious
inversion of the fifth Baker factor’s requirement for an “unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). It is not
the finality of an earlier decision by a coordinate branch that is required but rather the absence
of finality as imposed by the courts that is required.
169. The applicability of the Political Question Doctrine here also serves to invalidate
what would perhaps be the most karmically satisfying solution—to hold that both the Senate’s
pro forma sessions and the president’s pro forma session appointments are unconstitutional.
The appeal of being able to issue a stern admonishment to both the president and the Senate is
mighty indeed. While this solution preserves both the presently accepted construction of the
Clause as well as the current constitutional expectations, it likely cannot overcome the political
question analysis discussed in this Section.
170. Cf. Barkow, supra note 1, at 327 (“Placing some interpretive power with the politi-
cal branches also insures that those branches will, as a general matter, be more attentive to
constitutional concerns. [When the Court opts not to leave particular constitutional questions
with the political branches,] the political branches lose their sense of responsibility to analyze
independently the constitutionality of a particular course of action.”).
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and pro forma session recess appointments become a new fixture in the
constitutional firmament. That, when the Senate feels strongly about the
shortcomings of a particular candidate or wishes to make its voice known in
a policy debate, it will hold pro forma sessions to ostensibly “prevent” the
president from making any appointments. In response, when the president
feels that the Senate is doing so unreasonably, he will make pro forma ses-
sion appointments. Our constitutional expectations will be of each branch
accusing the other of unconstitutionality. But this is only one possibility.
Maybe we will return to the semifunctionality of the 1990s and 2000s. Or
maybe we will do something new.
Ultimately, the lesson here is that, in looking for a functional Recess
Appointments Clause, we must look not only to the formally construed
powers of the president or Congress but also to how these powers are to be
used.171 Every formal construction by one branch or the other is susceptible
to plausible absurdities that can disrupt functionality. Instead, we must look
to the expectations and manners of the president and the Senate, to each
branch’s understanding of its constitutional role and the valid and substan-
tive constitutional role of the other branch. The Constitution (as a written
document) and the great corpus of constitutional law would have us believe
that functionality stems from simply getting the formal interpretation of the
law right.172 It would lead us to believe that we can be, and are, a nation of
laws and laws alone. What the many textually defensible constructions of the
Recess Appointments Clause tell us, and what the many opportunities for
textually plausible absurdity tell us, is that however much we are a nation of
laws, we are also a nation of people, and that whatever constructions we
might place on the Constitution, they will always be, in some measure, inad-
equate.173 Constitutional behavior can never be fully codified or judicially
interpreted. No, the Constitution must rely, for its final defense, on the ex-
pectations, manners, and sentiments of the constitutional actors to whom it
is entrusted.
171. Niceties aside, the thesis hinted at herein is the utter irrelevancy of any formal
construction of the Recess Appointments Clause to its functionality. To the extent that we
argue for any particular interpretation, narrow or broad, we are arguing over the bones of a
beast without regard to its flesh and skin. The dysfunction in any particular construction is
born not of the Constitution or the construction but of us. It is our dysfunction. We make the
Constitution dysfunctional; it is not the other way around.
172. Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction 9 (1999) (“In many
ways, it is the striking presence of a written constitutional text that has blinded us to the
complexity of our constitutional discourse.”).
173. This is not a new proposition. Consider Professor Tiedeman’s somewhat anti-
quated assertion: “It is not so much what is found in the written constitution, as the conserva-
tive, law-abiding, and yet liberty-loving character of the Anglo-Saxon, which guarantees a
permanent free government to . . . the United States of America.” Christopher G. Tiedeman,
The Unwritten Constitution of the United States 20 (New York, Knickerbocker Press
1890).
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Conclusion
The functionality of the Recess Appointments Clause depends on the
degree to which it balances two competing purposes: maintaining the sepa-
ration of powers and ensuring that the executive power can continue to be
exercised. To achieve this functionality, formal construction of the Clause is
insufficient. Instead, we must consider the constitutional expectations of the
political actors involved. In this light, the constitutionality of the pro forma
sessions of the Senate and the pro forma session appointments by the presi-
dent should not be resolved judicially. Instead, the Supreme Court should
declare that the pro forma controversy presents a nonjusticiable political
question. This would enable the president and the Senate to establish consti-
tutional expectations that would ensure that the Recess Appointments
Clause remains functional and therefore fulfills its constitutional purpose.
